Nineteenth-century Arabic speakers used two key concepts to refer to education: schooling, or ta’lim, and upbringing, or tarbiya. While today many see these two terms as synonymous, the history of their relationship sheds light on a defining characteristic of nineteenth-century education in the Arab world and beyond: education’s promise to both transform the individual and contain social upheaval. This capacity to promise both transformation and stability made education important to reformers and statesmen around the nineteenth-century world. From France to Russia to Iran, education figured centrally in visions of state formation, individual progress, and social change. In Arabic, however, the dyad of ta’lim/tarbiya marked the tension between reform and stability particularly clearly.

While in previous centuries higher education had largely trained clerical, military, scholarly, or administrative elites while religious institutions handled the primary levels, in the nineteenth century many modernizing states made educational reform one of their primary objectives. Scholars have explained this widespread investment in educational reform...
as a product of elite desires for social control, state centralization efforts, the needs of the industrial workplace, and colonial attempts at domination and the resistance these provoked. But the outcomes of nineteenth-century educational expansions cannot fully account for the enthusiasm that preceded them. What’s more, it was not only elites and bureaucrats who bought in to modern education’s promises. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon, for example, new educational pathways appealed to students and parents from many different backgrounds.

This article turns to conceptual history to suggest a different explanation for why education inspired so much faith in the late nineteenth-century Arab world. Rather than focusing solely on education’s outcomes, I argue that education’s broad appeal resulted in part from its ability to promise both stability and reform, encapsulated in Arabic by the linking of upbringing (tarbiya) and schooling (ta’lim). In nineteenth-century Beirut and Mount Lebanon, tarbiya came to refer to processes of upbringing, education, and moral cultivation that promised to train obedient individuals to inhabit their places in society, imbuing the education/upbringing dyad with the power to stabilize existing social hierarchies. Ta’lim, by contrast, came to refer to the transfer of new skills and knowledges such as chemistry, foreign languages, and accounting that could open doors to professional success in medicine, diplomacy, and law. For non-elites, ta’lim generated enthusiasm for schooling as a path to class mobility. Thus, the tarbiya/ta’lim dyad enabled both elites and rising middle and lower classes to place their hopes in education. Ta’lim drew students to schools with the promise that the skills taught there could transform their trajectories, while those with access to capital could advocate tarbiya in order to reaffirm unequal distributions of power and wealth. Although many students reaped new benefits, education also reinscribed an existing social order in part thanks to its Janus-faced conceptual architecture.

Ian Hacking describes a concept as “a word in its sites” to emphasize that words gain power and meaning from how they circulate and signify in particular contexts. In turn, those contexts are also sometimes shaped by the power of words. Located at a crossroads between the politics of educational expansion and Arabic intellectual production, Beirut and Mount Lebanon were two key “sites” for the emergence of tarbiya/ta’lim in the Arabic-speaking world. Beirut and Mount Lebanon became crucibles of
educational reform in the second half of the nineteenth century. The presence of large Christian communities and the 1860-61 civil war prompted European and American missionaries and diplomats to expand their educational initiatives, and Ottoman reformers and local notables responded in kind. Schools competed for students’ loyalties and souls while offering new skills that prepared students for careers in medicine, law, and accounting, as well as foreign languages that could qualify students to become diplomats, teachers, or tradesmen. Simultaneously, Beirut became a hub for the production and circulation of Arabic thought. Before 1900, Beirut’s presses published fifty-five newspapers and journals and roughly fifteen hundred other works; between 1900 and 1914, 197 new periodicals appeared in the city. Many intellectuals who theorized tarbiya/ta’lim were connected to both this thriving print culture and the region’s schools, where they were students, teachers, and administrators. Their ideas, in turn, helped to shape how local educational institutions developed.

Education rose to the fore as demands for representative governance and ongoing economic transformations threatened to upset Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s sociopolitical terrain. Political reshuffling under Egyptian occupation (1832-41), the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876), and the rise of the silk economy introduced the possibility that common people might take part in governance, threatening established landholders’ power. Ottoman administrators advocated new ideas about representation in order to connect provincial elites to the center, which unintentionally sparked peasant revolts. Ottoman reform decrees in 1839 and 1856 promised subjects equal rights in various domains regardless of sect and introduced the idea that government should be accountable to the population. Meanwhile, new flows of capital and return migration from abroad opened new avenues of social mobility. New families rose to power through real estate, administration, and trade, and an urban middle class began to demand a voice in Beirut’s future. These transformations and demands for representation threatened old landholding elites and their social hierarchy. Overall, Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s sociopolitical terrain was ripe for profound transformation as the nineteenth century drew to a close. As Ussama Makdisi argues, however, “notable society” not only survived, but “persisted and even developed a new and modernized form which still dominates Lebanon today.”
How did established elites weather these challenges? This article reveals that those with access to capital defied the threats posed by nineteenth-century transformations in part by investing in educational institutions and ideas. To understand how they succeeded, we must first follow the emergence of a nineteenth-century concept of education in Arabic that appealed not only to elite backers hoping to maintain an existing social order, but also to students and parents of many different backgrounds hoping for a better life.

**Tarbiya and Ta’lim in Pedagogical Thought**

Over the nineteenth century, discussions about education in Arabic came to revolve around a dyad that appealed to different sectors of society. This section explores how thinkers and educators in Ottoman Beirut and Mount Lebanon came to pair the teaching of new sciences and skills, which they referred to as *ta’lim*, with the practice of *tarbiya*, or moral cultivation of obedient subjects who understood their place. As *ta’lim* became inextricable from *tarbiya*, education became a double-edged concept that appealed to both those who hoped for social and individual transformation and those who sought to guarantee the status quo.

*Tarbiya* and *ta’lim* are nouns deriving from the causative form of their respective verbs. *Ta’lim*, commonly translated as “education,” comes from the root ‘*-l-m*, meaning science or knowledge. In the classical lexicon, ‘*ilm* typically referred to knowledge of “definite things” such as the Qur’an or its interpretations. Tarbiya comes from the Arabic root *r-b-a*; pre-nineteenth century invocations of this root concerned matters of height, nourishment, and non-instrumental, open-ended processes of growth and cultivation. In premodern texts, *tarbiya* also described processes of ethical attunement and the formation of young scholars, although writers often referred to these in the language of moral philosophy, or *tahdhib al-akhlaq*.

In the nineteenth century, both roots took on new meanings as Arabic-speaking scholars engaged with Europe, encountered and theorized new models of institutionalized education, and wrote in the emerging Arabic press. ‘*Ilm*, as Marwa Elshakry observes, transformed into a category encompassing new scientific ideas. As this section will show, *ta’lim* changed alongside ‘*ilm*, coming to denote the transfer of specific knowledges like biology, chemistry, accounting, and household management. In parallel,
the open-ended processes of general cultivation previously associated with *tarbiya* became harnessed to specific human ends. As Timothy Mitchell notes, *tarbiya* became the name for a “new field of practices” associated with modern education in the last decades of the nineteenth century.\(^\text{18}\) While Egyptian intellectual Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi did not deploy *tarbiya* to describe education in his 1834 *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz*, by 1872, Tahtawi was identifying *tarbiya* and *ta‘lim* as the dual process leading children out of ignorance and incapacity.\(^\text{19}\) The late nineteenth-century, then, produced a dyadic concept of education—new skills and moral cultivation, *ta‘lim* and *tarbiya*—that prefigured a new relationship between education, social order, and social mobility.\(^\text{20}\)

A few examples articulated by educators and school administrators in Beirut and Mount Lebanon show how those driving the region’s educational expansion both paired and differentiated *tarbiya* and *ta‘lim*. In 1852, Henry De Forest delivered a short lecture to the Syrian Society of Arts and Sciences entitled “On the Moral Cultivation of Children” (*Fi Tarbiyat al-Awlad*).\(^\text{21}\) De Forest, a Protestant missionary from New York, had established a girls’ school in his Beirut home in the late 1840s. In his lecture, delivered in Arabic before an audience of other missionaries and Beirut intellectuals, De Forest depicted *tarbiya* as covering a lot of ground. It included the swaddling, washing, and dressing of infants, training in reading and writing, and the cultivation of virtues like truthfulness (*al-sidq*), obedience (*al-ta‘a*), love (*al-mahabba*), and worship (*al-‘ibada*). De Forest classified *ta‘lim*, on the other hand, under one branch of *tarbiya*: the cultivation of minds (*tarbiyat al-‘uqul*). This cultivation included such skills as reading, writing, geography, and arithmetic.\(^\text{22}\) By making *ta‘lim* a specific branch of the larger project of *tarbiya*, De Forest linked moral cultivation to the transfer of particular skills.\(^\text{23}\)

In an 1849 speech to the same society, educator and intellectual Butrus al-Bustani presented a slightly different view of the relationship between *ta‘lim* and *tarbiya*. He portrayed *tarbiya* as something women would learn how to do through proper schooling, or *ta‘lim*. In the speech, called “On the Education of Women” (*Khitab fi Ta‘lim al-Nisa‘*), Bustani remarked that one negative consequence of ignoring women’s education (*ta‘lim*) was that they knew nothing of “the *tarbiya* of children, the management of the household . . . and the care of the sick.”\(^\text{24}\) Like De Forest, Bustani paired but differenti-
ated the concepts of tarbiya and ta’lim, figuring tarbiya as childrearing and ta’lim as formal schooling. Bustani’s text also presaged later developments by tying both tarbiya and ta’lim to important, if still abstract, social goods like civilization (tamaddun) and reform (islah).

By the 1870s, the conceptual landscape had changed, and many began to articulate tarbiya and ta’lim as means to specific social ends. The establishment of numerous educational institutions meant that more children attended modern schools and actually encountered the heady mix of tarbiya and ta’lim. Parents and teachers became increasingly concerned about what children’s educations entailed. Growing competition among Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim schools meant that institutions began to publicize their educational philosophies more explicitly and broadly. Meanwhile, journals like al-Jinan (est. 1870), al-Bashir (est. 1870), and Thamarat al-Funun (est. 1875) brought a new diversity and specificity to educational debates in the press. In an 1873 article in al-Jinan, for example, Bustani published a report on the progress of the nonsectarian National School he had founded after the 1860-61 war. Expanding on his 1849 argument that education formed the bedrock of “reform” and “civilization,” Bustani’s 1873 article directed ta’lim and tarbiya toward even more specific social ends. While his school provided “schooling in those languages and knowledges” (ta’lim fi tilka al-lughat wa-l-ma’arif) that the country most needed, the school’s main task was to “cultivate a love of the nation” (tarbiyat mahabbat al-watan) among children of various sects.

An 1879 speech by Husayn Bayhum (1833-81), later published in the newspaper Thamarat al-Funun, instrumentalized tarbiya and ta’lim even more clearly. Bayhum was a founding member of Beirut’s Sunni educational association the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society (est. 1878). He spoke before Syria’s Ottoman governor Midhat Pasha to set forth his view of tarbiya and ta’lim as means to particular ends. “It is not a secret that knowledge (al-ma’arif) is the basis of every initiative,” he pronounced; “it is the reason for the uplift of nations in terms of morals (adab) and material [wealth]. This is among the axiomatic truths.” Unfortunately, in Bayhum’s view, knowledge among Beiruti Muslims was “in a lamentable state, at the lowest degree of backwardness.” “Where are the schools (al-madaris wa-l-makatib)?” he asked plaintively. “What are the sciences (’ulum) that are studied, and what are the lessons (durus) that are taught?” Here, Bayhum’s rhetorical questions...
indicate that there ought to have been specific answers. “What means do we have,” he continued, “to improve our [ability] to extract the treasures of the land through agriculture (al-zira’a), or to transform and perfect the conditions of industry? On what basis will we become experts in trade?”

Bayhum clearly expected education to raise national morals (adab) for the good of the community and to prepare individual students for success in agriculture and industry. Education was beginning to appeal to both those who sought to use it to strengthen a communal social order or to assure individual professional success.

It was not only Muslim thinkers who articulated a concept of education directed toward both moral ends at the community level and practical ends at the individual level. In an 1862 letter to his Parisian superiors, Beirut-based Jesuit educator Étienne Monnier expressed a similar sentiment, this time in French. The first goal of the proposed Jesuit University in Beirut, he wrote, would be to effect a “double perfection.” The university would seek to “spread the benefits of the true civilization and shape the hearts of young people according to Christian and social virtues,” on one hand, and also “adorn their spirits with the knowledges and expertise (connaissances) that will equip them to contribute to the prosperity of their religion, their country, and their family.”

Monnier’s “double perfection” correlated perfectly with the Arabic pairing of tarbiya and ta’lim. Education would be a matter of both moral attunement and practical preparation for professional success.

What were the implications of this pairing? To answer this question, let’s think with Harriet La Grange, headmistress of the elite Tripoli Girls’ School, who wrote a long series in Arabic on education in the Beirut-based Protestant weekly, al-Nashra al-Usbu’iyya, in 1901. Born and educated in upstate New York, La Grange (1845-1927) was one of Syria’s longest-serving American Protestant missionaries. Based in Tripoli from 1876 to 1922, she oversaw the education of generations of young Syrian women, many of whom became teachers themselves. Her series, entitled, “Advice for Parents and Teachers on the Training of Children” (Nasa’ih li-l-Walidayn wa-l-Mu’allimin fi Tahdhib al-Awlad), explored early childhood education, which she referred to as tarbiya rather than ta’lim, and hinted at the sociopolitical implications of the new, dual concept of education in Arabic. In an article called “Union and the Greatness of Its Benefit” (al-Ittihad wa-'Uzmat Nafa’ihi), La Grange explained that one important role of education was to teach children their
proper place in the world. “The basis of kindergarten,” she remarked, “is that ‘all are one’ (al-kull wahid). If one leaves the group circle, he breaks it and it will not be complete without his return.” Kindergarten students, then, should be taught the importance of protecting the community even at the expense of the individual.

La Grange recommended teaching kindergarteners that this community required a particular order, in which all could not be quite equal or alike. “It is not possible,” she counseled, “for each person to be a flower in the garden. Some people have to be a fence to prevent goats and cows and other animals from entering the garden and destroying its flowers.” La Grange used this image as a metaphor for social life, in which “you build cities and towns together, clear roads, plant trees, and build churches, houses, and stores. While the carpenter makes the chair, the pine tree grows from the soil, the woodcutter cuts it, and someone else carries it into the city.” Good tarbiya, then, would produce a social structure that harmonized existing human differences rather than encouraging people to change their innate destinies. People could inhabit society peacefully and productively only by performing the duties they were meant for. Tarbiya, or moral cultivation in the name of the collective, thus promised to temper ta’lim’s disruptive potential.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the transfer of new skills in science, medicine, engineering, and accounting denoted by ta’lim had become tied to promises about individual prosperity as well as to moral cultivation, or tarbiya, in the name of a collective social order. The development of this Janus-faced dyad had effects beyond the pages of newspapers and journals. The next section shows how this concept of education not only reflected emerging dynamics in the region’s schools but also helped shape how they developed.

The Political Economy of Pedagogy

In the late nineteenth century, inhabitants of Beirut and Mount Lebanon joined European and American missionaries and Ottoman statesmen in founding schools at the primary, secondary, and university levels. This section shows how the dual concept of tarbiya/ta’lim enabled this educational expansion by inspiring both substantial investment in schools by
those with access to local, missionary, European, and Ottoman capital and students’ desire to attend these schools despite their often conservative outcomes. Schools made commitments to teaching new sciences and skills, or ta’lim, which attracted students by promising individual uplift. At the same time, the schools often fulfilled the hopes of founders and administrators who wanted to secure obedience and social stability on their own terms through moral cultivation or tarbiya, whether or not the term was explicitly invoked. This section examines how tarbiya/ta’lim allowed Catholic, Sunni, and Protestant schools in late Ottoman Beirut and Mount Lebanon to attract students hoping for a better future while stabilizing an established status quo.34

In the mid-nineteenth century, Catholic missionaries, the French government, and wealthy Maronite families began founding schools in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. These stakeholders shaped curricula and prospectuses that advertised new skills while ensuring that Catholic institutions would largely reproduce existing hierarchies. The French government and European missionary organizations, primarily L’Œuvre des Écoles d’Orient and the L’Œuvre de la Propagation de la Foi, funded a large number of Catholic schools. Missionaries and diplomats distributed the money earmarked for education through local elite families, like the Khazins and the Jumayyils. These local allies became increasingly important after 1860 as the French battle for influence against the Americans and the British heightened. As money for schools began to pour in from Europe, established Catholic families used their control over the distribution of educational funds to reaffirm a vision of social order that secured their positions and patronage networks. They constructed a two-track educational arrangement: private secondary institutions for boys, or collèges, trained, certified, and socialized the children of the privileged, while primary schools taught obedience and respect for authority to the children of the non-elite. Together, these two kinds of schools harnessed the promise of ta’lim as a means of individual social mobility to inspire a broad swath of society to invest in education. Simultaneously, limited access to Catholic secondary institutions and a focus on tarbiya at the primary level helped to reaffirm an existing social order.

Elite administrators kept the two tracks of Catholic education, primary and secondary, separate by managing tuition costs and scholarship disbursement. High fees at the top-tier Catholic collèges in Antoura ('Ayntura, est.
1834) and Ghazir (est. 1843, which became Beirut’s Université Saint-Joseph in 1875) ensured that paying students would be drawn from the region’s wealthy families. In 1850, Ghazir charged lay students roughly fifteen Ottoman lira per year; by 1872, this tuition had risen to 20.5 lira.35 In 1890, a year at Université Saint-Joseph (USJ) cost six hundred francs (twenty-six lira) and at Antoura, four hundred francs (17.3 lira). Other Maronite Catholic collèges founded by Lebanese clerics in the later decades of the nineteenth century charged 10.8-13 lira per year.36 These were substantial sums, given that a policeman’s yearly salary in 1890 was around twenty-five Ottoman lira.37 Other students received scholarships (bourses) from Catholic missionary organizations or the French government, but these bourses reinscribed rather than mitigated the elite character of Catholic secondary education.38 The French earmarked scholarships for the children of the region’s elite. For example, as a note attached to the 1862 list of French grants to Catholic schools and charitable organizations in Syria remarked, the eighty bourses to Antoura in that year were intended for “the sons of shaykhs and emirs.”39 Scholarships at these schools and at the local Maronite-run collèges were awarded through a consultation process among local elites and Beirut’s French Consulate. Parents or recommenders wrote letters requesting scholarships for particular children, specifying the preferred collège, most frequently USJ or Antoura.40 They submitted these requests to the French Consulate, which compiled a list of students to receive a bourse. Once the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved the list, scholarships were granted accordingly.

The fact that connections mattered helped to entrench the inaccessibility of top-tier Catholic education. Local clerical elites like Archbishop Bustani of Beirut and heads of important families like the Khazins wrote recommendations for prospective students. While having a notable or important cleric for a recommender would not guarantee a scholarship, students with a “known” recommender or parent were much more likely to receive one than those whose recommenders were listed as “unknown” (inconnu).41 Thus, it is not surprising that out of the fifty-five scholarship requests the Consulate received in 1880-81, the sixteen successful candidates hailed mostly from the Catholic elite.42 The note for successful applicant Sharfan Dahdah even reminded the Consul that his family was wealthy (riche). The French vice consul, Maronite notable As’ad Karam, and the prominent Dahir family
each personally selected three additional students. The Dahirs and Karams recommended their relatives, and the others were similarly elite children, including a member of the Faranjyya notable Maronite family and the son of dragoman Michel Turbey.43

Top-tier Catholic institutions sought to train, socialize, and credential their elite clientele, but they also deployed a broader rhetoric that promoted education—in the sense of ta’lim—as an accessible pathway to a better life. The 1877 USJ prospectus, for example, advertised an education that would “encompass all of the knowledges (connaissances) that could open for a young, intelligent man all of the liberal careers, help him to access the highest positions, and acquit himself with honor” on the French baccalaureate exam, which was becoming a desirable professional credential.44 Antoura and USJ offered Turkish, modern Greek, English, German and Italian alongside history, geography, arithmetic, bookkeeping, and commercial accounting, all subjects that promised to prepare students for middle- or upper-class careers in diplomacy, bureaucracy, or trade.45 The prospectus even explicitly linked the literary arts to future success in remunerative and high-status professions. “The treasures of poetry and eloquence,” the prospectus averred, offered “indispensable resources for the study of the sciences, particularly medicine and law.”46 By linking potentially remunerative careers like medicine, law, trade, and diplomacy to new knowledges acquired through a USJ education, rather than to inherited status or family name, the prospectus advertised education’s potential to serve as a vehicle for social mobility. As entrance to USJ was theoretically open to all, this promise invited applications from across the social spectrum. In practice, however, USJ and other elite Catholic institutions, operating under the aegis of the French Foreign Ministry, mainly served to equip elite sons to maintain their status in a changing world.

Catholic missionaries, Beirut and Mountain Lebanon’s elites, and the French government also invested in primary education. This expansion widened the base of students attracted to USJ and other institutions’ apparently open promises of professional success, who aspired—often in vain—to a place at USJ. But simultaneously primary educational institutions cultivated obedience and piety in younger students.47 Starting in the 1840s, Jesuit teachers joined the Lazarist Filles de la Charité in educating large numbers of children in Catholic primary schools.48 Local elite families
like the Jumayyils and the Hubayqas funded these orders, providing land, buildings, and revenue from their pious foundations (awqaf).\textsuperscript{49} As Chantal Verdeil notes, a few fee-paying primary schools in wealthy towns like Beirut and Dayr al-Qamar offered a “bourgeois education” in the arts, French, Arabic, history, geography, and arithmetic.\textsuperscript{50} But elsewhere, primary-level pedagogy centered on \textit{tarbiya}, i.e., training in obedience, piety, and basic literacy, rather than preparing students for upper-class life or admission to the collèges. Tellingly, a list of pedagogical directives for the Xaverians, who ran village primary schools for the Jesuits between c. 1862 and 1875, did not touch on what subjects would be taught. Instead, it gave detailed advice about how often students must take communion and go to confession, alongside suggestions about modesty (\textit{al-hishma}) and dress. The section on “orderliness” (\textit{al-tartib}) began by noting that “all teachers, when they are working with students, should have their hands on a rod.\textsuperscript{51}

The combination of top-tier Catholic collèges offering professional credentials and elite socialization and the broader availability of primary education in Catholic primary schools inspired hopes that education could transform students, who flocked to Catholic institutions. Enrollment at Catholic primary and secondary schools in Greater Syria skyrocketed in the last half of the nineteenth century, rising from twelve hundred in 1856 to over twelve thousand in 1906 at Jesuit schools alone.\textsuperscript{52} Although non-elite boys were unlikely to be admitted to the top collèges, they wrote requests for admission showcasing their love of France and Catholicism. One student wrote in French: “As I know that you are the refuge of the poor, and as I have studied this language that is the good (\textit{le bien}) of the universe [. . .] and as I have hope for the beneficence of God and of yourselves, I come to throw myself at your feet that you may accept me at any collège you like, may God repay you.” He signed his letter “Fadlallah Habcouk, de la nation Catholique.”\textsuperscript{53} Habcouk may have received a scholarship, although his name does not clearly appear on lists for subsequent years. Regardless, his letter underscores how desirable Catholic education appeared to non-elites, perhaps because it advertised an open pathway to remunerative careers. But perhaps Habcouk’s rhetorical supplication demonstrates the influence of \textit{talim}/\textit{tarbiya} in his primary schooling. He and others like him desired mobility, but they knew that these pathways were not designed with them in mind. French-Catholic education upheld an existing social order by
socializing and credentialing young men with connections to an older class of landholding elites, and also inspired students outside this group with a faith in education. This faith kept non-elite children invested in that order and flocking to the primary schools that taught them to value modesty and obedience.

Like their Catholic contemporaries, Beirut’s Sunni Muslim elites began in the mid-nineteenth century to establish new institutions. These institutions projected ta’lim as a path to personal and communal transformation while upholding a particular social order that differed slightly from what the Catholics had in mind. Established families from Beirut’s Sunni community like the Bayhums, Barbirs, and Da’uqs joined ascendant families like the Qabbanis to invest in schools, primarily through the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society (Jam’iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya) founded in Beirut in 1878. Unlike Catholic educational projects, which drew predominantly on established Maronite families, Beirut’s Sunni educational endeavors brought together old merchant and landowning families with the bureaucrats and tradesmen of the emerging middle class. Together, they shaped institutions that separated educational pathways into two tracks: those who would finish their studies or go to vocational school after primary school, and those who would go on to higher education and more lucrative careers.

Ottoman education in Beirut began with the establishment of a military academy (rüşdiye askeriye) before 1867. Shortly thereafter, the 1869 Educational Regulation brought schools under a unified legal framework and called for the establishment of provincial educational administrations, standardized curricula, teacher training and certification, and the expansion of schools. Although the regulation promised to replace the older secondary (rüşdiye) schools with preparatory (îdâdiye) schools across the empire and offer an education comparable to French lycées, the law was not implemented until the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (r. 1876-1909). Even then, the regulation failed to change much at the primary level, which Sunnis in Beirut considered key to their children’s success. Given the limits of state-sponsored educational reform, a group of Sunni Muslim merchants and notables in Beirut founded the Maqasid Society to provide primary education for Beirut’s Muslims. Their frustration with the status quo was clear: as an 1880 pamphlet noted, “If the different communities do
not prepare their children for admission [to secondary schools] they will be deprived of their benefits.” Accordingly, the Society’s first act was to establish primary schools. By 1880, 450 girls and over four hundred boys were studying at Maqasid primaries.

Representatives of the city’s Sunni elite and merchant class continued to develop educational endeavors in cooperation with Istanbul after the Maqasid was formally subsumed into a Provincial Educational Council in 1880. The initiatives they sponsored focused on both tarbiya and ta’lim as foundations of individual social mobility and broader social order within an Ottoman system that sought to cultivate teachers and bureaucrats with good morals who were loyal to the state. At the same time, costs and admissions policies mostly kept elites and non-elites on separate educational paths, allowing the schools’ founders to direct educational developments toward local social stability.

Sunni educators in Beirut emphasized the importance of both tarbiya and ta’lim in secondary as well as primary education, retaining moral cultivation alongside new skills as a foundation for individual social mobility within the Ottoman system. Perhaps more than their Catholic counterparts, Maqasid primary schools offered education in the sense of both tarbiya and ta’lim. They taught skills like basic reading, writing, arithmetic, accounting, and Arabic morphology and syntax (al-nahw wa-l-sarf) alongside moral subjects like the study of Qur’an, religious doctrine and the unity of God (al-‘aqa’id wa-l-tawhid), and ethical cultivation and comportment (tahdhib al-akhlaq wa-l-adab).

In contrast to the primary schools, the Ottoman Sultaniyya, or high school (est. 1883), designed its curriculum to credential, train, and socialize elite sons to become merchants, landowners, and Ottoman administrators. Like the primary schools, however, the Sultaniyya’s curriculum had a strong moral component, placing subjects like French, arithmetic, geography, natural philosophy, and natural history alongside the study of the Qur’an, recitation, and ethics (akhlqaq). Like the top-tier Catholic collèges, the Sultaniyya’s curriculum promised to prepare students for careers in bureaucracy, trade, or diplomacy and to produce practitioners of sciences like chemistry who could go on to medical school. By marrying these new subjects with the study of Islamic ethics and Qur’anic recitation, however, the Ottoman curriculum emphasized its links with Beirut’s Muslim population and drew on aspects of a traditional Islamic education to create
a cadre of Ottoman teachers, businessmen, and statesmen prepared for a new age but still loyal to the Sultan.61

According to Beirut’s Education Minister in 1892, these new opportunities inspired an “extraordinary degree of desire (rağbet fêvkâlâde bir derece)” among the region’s Muslim population.62 The students who flocked to the Maqasid’s doors were perhaps inspired by the idea that they could progress easily from Maqasid primary schools to the Sultaniyya. They had various reasons to think this could be the case. The capacious curriculum at Maqasid primary schools promised to prepare students to move on to a top-tier secondary institution. Even more tellingly, Ottoman officials publicized broad promises to open higher education to all boys, potentially inspiring students from all backgrounds to hope for admission to the Sultaniyya. According to a report in Thamarat al-Funun, the Sultaniyya promised to “welcome students for free from all the classes (sunuf) of the people (ahali),” agreeing to “accept for free those who completed their primary education in the elementary and secondary schools and who excelled both morally and scholastically.”63

Despite these promises, however, cost and admissions policies mostly kept affluent and impoverished Muslim students on separate educational paths, allowing middle-class and elite founders to turn educational developments toward social stability. Primary education was probably quite broadly available, at least for children who could be spared from work. Maqasid primary schools were free, funded by awqaf revenue and monthly contributions from Maqasid members and both the wealthy and middle strata of Beirut’s broader Sunni community.64 Accordingly, students at Maqasid primary schools were likely diverse in terms of class. Some, like ‘A’isha Tabbara and Khazindar Bayhum, were children of Maqasid members and hailed from affluent families.65 On the other hand, the relatively rapid growth of the Maqasid schools (to approximately eight hundred students in their first four years) suggests they must have attracted students from outside the city’s uppermost strata. The fact that Arabic was the language of instruction rather than French or English also would have made Maqasid schools relatively accessible to non-elite students.

At the secondary level, however, options diverged. The two secondary institutions funded by Sunni elites in Beirut suited different student populations. As we saw, the Sultaniyya offered sciences and foreign languages as
subjects of study. The cost to attend, however, was eight Ottoman lira and fifteen for boarding students. This amount was less than the tuition charged by the top-tier Catholic collèges with which the Sultaniyya competed, but still a hefty sum at a moment when primary schoolteachers were paid a lira and a half to two lira per month. For those who couldn’t pay the admission fees, there was the vocational school (medrese-i sanâyi) established in 1887 by the wealthy Da’uq and Ardati families, who put up ten thousand lira they raised by issuing shares in their own company. By 1892, the vocational school was teaching women “sewing and tailoring” and training men “in the skills of shoemaking, book-binding, goldsmithery, painting, engraving, printing, and other arts and crafts.” The vocational school would be revived ten years later in 1902 as a full-fledged Ottoman industrial school.

Established members of Beirut’s Sunni elite invested financially and intellectually in education, they developed a two-track educational structure in which many could attend primary school, but only those who could pay would make it to the Sultaniyya and receive the advanced training and certification necessary for an Ottoman bureaucratic career.

Despite the potential for social mobility suggested by the Ottoman government’s promises, broad access to Maqasid primary schools, and the Sultaniyya’s ambitious curriculum, evidence suggests that the Sultaniyya enrolled mostly the sons of elites. In 1883, the school registered fifty-five students, many of whom came from the region’s important families. Seven came from the Jerusalem-based Husayni family alone, while others hailed from Beirut’s other notable families—whether Muslim, Druze, or Christian—and/or were sons or grandsons of Ottoman officials. The Sultaniyya’s twelve lira tuition was one potential reason for this; another was the reported propensity of the city’s elites to appropriate government scholarships, meant for poor students, for their own offspring. Many students would have resembled ‘Umar Salih al-Barghouti, a young man from outside Jerusalem. Barghouti’s father sent him to the Sultaniyya in 1907 with his yearly boarding fee, ten lira for expenses, and an open invitation to go to his father’s friend (a member of the notable Tabbara family) if he needed more cash. Barghouti lived well as a student in Beirut. He spent nights in the city with his classmates “reveling, watching films or popular dances, or [partaking in] sexual pleasures with a young girl or other matters,” all pastimes available to young Beirutis with money in their pockets.

Those, unlike
Barghouti, who could not afford the Sultaniyya’s fees could attend Ardati and Da’uq’s trade school, which offered a different set of skills and opened up a different, and less remunerative, set of career options and social ties.

As elite Catholics from Mount Lebanon founded schools with European missionaries, Beirut’s Sunni elite worked with Ottoman officials to institute and manage an educational network in which they influenced curricula and pedagogy for both elite and non-elite students. They emphasized tarbiya as well as ta’lim at both secondary and primary levels, promoting a vision of education that offered students access to new skills and new careers while producing moral, loyal bureaucrats for the Ottoman state. While the sons of elite families and perhaps a few scholarship students attended the Sultaniyya, for most, formal education stopped after primary school. Thus, while these institutions portrayed education as a means to transformation for all, it mostly worked to allow elite sons to maintain their fathers’ positions. If a few non-elite students progressed into the higher tiers, they were exceptions to the rule. Seeking opportunities for mobility through ta’lim, most students ended up with tarbiya instead.

As Beirut’s elite Sunnis and Mount Lebanon’s Catholic landholders invested in educational endeavors, both opposed the formidable educational apparatus established by American Protestants. Lacking a sympathetic local elite to shape school-building efforts around their own classed visions of social order, the Protestant schools offered a relatively large degree of social mobility. Their flagship institution was the Syrian Protestant College (SPC), established in Beirut in 1866 and renamed the American University of Beirut in 1920. The SPC made and kept broad promises to offer ta’lim, i.e., to educate and credential boys from all backgrounds to become doctors, teachers, and businessmen. At the same time, however, Protestant primary institutions focused on moral and religious education, or tarbiya, which they hoped—against reason—would attract converts to their cause and implement their own vision of spiritual, racial, and geopolitical order. Overall, the mixed promises of Protestant educational institutions inspired a broad array of students to come seeking ta’lim, but the schools also largely upheld hierarchies between urban and rural, and local and missionary.

Protestant schools, including the SPC, sometimes bore out the new concept of education’s promises of social mobility. Children from all socio-economic backgrounds attended Protestant primary schools, which some-
times served as conduits for non-elite boys to access the SPC. Village boys like Jabr Dumit, Dawud Qurban, and Jirjis Khuri al-Makdisi, none of whom came from established elite families, attended Protestant village schools in Safita, Marj’ayun, and Tripoli, respectively. Once identified as promising students, they entered the SPC’s collegiate department by way of the Protestant Theological Seminary at Abeih (Abayh) or the SPC’s own preparatory department. And although tuition at the SPC was comparable to other elite institutions, the SPC made concrete efforts to admit non-elite boys. The 1861 SPC prospectus promised “scholarships for indigent students,” noting that “in a land where most of the population are poor—and Protestants especially, sometimes for the very fact of having left their old faith, are generally unable to do much for the support of their sons at the college—unusual efforts are necessary to encourage promising young men to undertake a thorough course of study.” The college pledged to arrange teaching jobs or other forms of labor for “poor and deserving students.” The SPC offered these work-study scholarships until at least 1882 and probably much longer. What’s more, attempts to make the SPC accessible to non-elites worked, at least for some: the yearly lists of SPC graduates included children from non-elite as well as elite backgrounds.

Despite all this, socioeconomic distinctions marked daily life at the SPC. While regular students could pay twelve lira per year for an iron bedstead, a straw mattress in the dormitory, and local food in the regular dining room, wealthy students could pay twenty-five lira for one third of a sleeping room and the privilege to eat European food at a special table in the dining room. For fifty-five lira, they could have a private room, including fuel, lights, and washing facilities, and eat European food at a private table.

Like the Catholic collèges and the Sultaniyya, the SPC was a training ground for ta’lim, i.e., the skills demanded by professions like medicine, administration, and trade. According to an early prospectus, the college sought to “enable native youth to obtain in this country the literary, scientific, and professional education which the exigencies of the community demand” (emphasis in original). The emphasis on “in this country” spoke to a growing fear among missionaries that Protestant schooling might inspire students to emigrate abroad, removing or at least “de-nationalizing” the very students missionaries hoped would convert others. The SPC thus arranged their curriculum to provide “literary, scientific, and professional education” on
Ottoman soil. By 1889, students in the preparatory department took subjects of potential professional value including English, French, and arithmetic. The college offered more specialized preparation in the new sciences such as chemistry and botany as well as psychology, moral philosophy, and logic. The medical department oversaw a separate undergraduate curriculum specifically designed for future doctors as well as a two-year course in pharmacy. This training equipped SPC students for professional success regardless of their family or financial backgrounds. Offering them in Beirut allowed the SPC to keep bright students from emigrating abroad.

While the SPC was more open than comparable institutions in terms of class mobility, it upheld a distinct hierarchy between students from urban and rural areas, with non-elite rural students more likely to receive *tarbiya* in the primary schools and less likely to reap the benefits of *ta’lim*. This hierarchy mirrored divisions within the mission itself. Missionaries in rural areas competed with urban colleagues for limited resources in the shadow of a lengthy debate about whether to emphasize Arabic primary schooling to produce native preachers or meet local demands for English-language training and higher education. In the 1890s, urban areas like Beirut grew wealthier and rural areas suffered from the silk economy’s collapse. In this period, the student body probably skewed toward the relatively wealthy as it skewed toward the relatively urban, although children of rural elite families often attended urban flagship schools. Students from schools in the large towns of Beirut, Tripoli, Zahle, and Sidon were far more likely than their non-elite rural colleagues to make it to the SPC. In rural schools, “most of the pupils [.] were bound to revert to illiteracy after leaving the school and becoming part of their environment. Few of them went to urban schools where achievement of permanent literacy was more assured.” Teaching at rural schools focused more often on *tarbiya* and the Bible, so students had fewer opportunities to encounter subjects that could facilitate lucrative professional work, although this differed by location. As one 1857 report noted, in the wealthy town of Dayr al-Qamar, “the Bible was taught to some extent” but missionaries “were obliged to bait the hook with arithmetic,” whereas in the smaller nearby town of ‘Ayn Zahalta, “God’s word was sufficient charm in and of itself.” In the end, however, as an 1888 report noted, “the greater part of the children taught in these [village] schools never reach the higher schools,” creating a marked divide
between students who attended Protestant primary schools in urban hubs and in the villages.89

This divide between urban and rural students helped to maintain social order in Ottoman Beirut and Mount Lebanon by skewing opportunities toward inhabitants of wealthy towns, rural elites who could afford to send their children away, and those handpicked by missionaries as particularly “promising.” But life at the college itself inculcated a distinct social order based on race. Since the early 1830s, Protestant education had a marked interest in keeping the “native” native. This distinction continued to separate Protestant educators born in Greater Syria from those born in the United States throughout the century.90 The SPC paid “native” teachers far less than Americans, regardless of their level of education. Native SPC teachers made between forty-nine percent and sixty-three percent of the salary of Americans in the same positions.91 This divide reached down to the primary and secondary levels. In Tripoli in 1882, for example, the mission spent $1,282.25 per month on the room and board of Harriet La Grange, then the headmistress of the Tripoli Girls’ School, compared to $481 to pay a local teacher, Jabr Dumit, and $100 for other local assistant teachers.92

Despite these hierarchies, Protestant schools fueled a desire for education and a faith in its promises among elites and non-elites alike. And despite fluctuations in the mission’s budget, transformations in its administration, and internal divides about its goals, student enrollment grew from the seven pupils who enrolled in the first mission school in 1824 to several thousand by the mid-1870s.93 A 1903 report observed an “increasing desire for knowledge” among students.94 Another from 1905 remarked that “the open secret of the matter is that is that Syrians of all classes give us more of their money and more of their children in order that we may carry on our educational work among American evangelical lines.”95 Many students seem to have felt what Layyah Barakat, who defied her parents to attend the Protestant school in her village in the 1880s, described as a “fever for an education” inspired by Protestant schools’ promises.96 As La Grange observed, “parents have at last got it into their heads that their boys and girls must be educated. And they have come to have a frantic desire to get them into some boarding school and off their hands, assuming to think they are there well on their way to fortune.”97 Like French-Maronite and Ottoman Sunni educational institutions, Protestant schools drew on the
two-faced concept of *tarbiya/ta’lim* to entice students through school doors with promises of social mobility while designing educational pathways to reflect administrators’ views of social order.

**Conclusion**

The “frantic desires” noted by La Grange and the “fever for an education” experienced by Barakat burned around the world as the nineteenth century drew to a close. Rather than explaining educational enthusiasm in the Arab world solely as the outcome of state reform, colonial soft power and its opposition, industrialization, or elite strategies, I have argued that the *tarbiya/ta’lim* dyad inspired adherents across class in part because its conceptual architecture allowed it to encompass both moral cultivation and professional training. This architecture made education appear to be a path to both social order and social mobility. Analyzing the development of educational institutions and pathways in Ottoman Beirut and Mount Lebanon makes clear that these ideas mattered, as ideas sometimes do. Together, *tarbiya* and *ta’lim* motivated those with access to local, missionary, European, and Ottoman capital to invest in educational institutions and inspired students’ desire to fill those schools despite their often conservative effects.
Author's Note: My thanks to Matthew Ghazarian, Samera Esmeir, Aaron Rock-Singer, Nir Shafir, and the peer reviewers, as well as participants in the “Beyond Circulation” workshop at Columbia University (7-8 October 2016) and the “Futures of Intellectual History” conference at UC Berkeley (28-29 October 2016). This research was funded in part by the Council of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) and SSRC-IDRF.


5. Hacking continues: “That means attending to a variety of types of sites: the sentences in which the word is actually (not potentially) used, those who speak those sentences, with what authority, in what institutional settings, in order to influence whom, with what consequences for the speakers” (and hearers and readers). Ian Hacking, *Historical Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 17.


10. Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*.


Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 162. See also Akarlı, The Long Peace.


See, for example, the entry for r-b-a in al-Qamus al-Muhit, which gives examples including the rising of plants from the soil and of flour when water is added. Muhammad ibn Ya'qub’ al-Firuzabadi, al-Qamus al-Muhit (Beirut: Maktab Tahqiq al-Turath, 1902).


Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 88-89.

Ibid.

Egypt witnessed similar changes to the concept of tarbiya, one of “eight words” identified by Husayn al-Marsafi in his 1881 treatise. See Marsafi, Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2011).


De Forest, Bustani, and La Grange were among those who supported girls’ ta’lim as well as tarbiya. Often justified as a way to guarantee social order by producing mothers for “the sons of tomorrow,” girls’ ta’lim sometimes disrupted the status quo in unintended ways. By the early twentieth century, girls educated to be mothers were entering other professions. See Ellen Fleischmann, “‘Under an American Roof’: The Beginnings of the American Junior College for Women in Beirut,” Arab Studies Journal 17, no. 1 (2009), 62-84.

De Forest, “Fi Tarbiyat al-Awlad.”


Julia Hauser, Christine B. Lindner, and Esther Möller, eds., Entangled Education: Foreign and Local Schools in Ottoman Syria and Mandate Lebanon (Beirut: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2016), 81.


“Khitab Bayhum,” Thamarat al-Funun, 25 June-7 July 1879.

Ibid.

Other writers in Thamarat al-Funun shared Bayhum’s view that education was for the collective good of the community as well as individual enrichment. See for example “Ta’mit al-Makatib fi-l-Qura,” Thamarat al-Funun 19 September-1 October 1894; and “al-Ma’arif,” Thamarat al-Funun 24 February-10 March 1890.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Orthodox, Druze, Jewish, and Shi’a also participated in educational expansion, but difficulty with access to archival resources led me to concentrate on other actors.

Ghazir Diaries, Notes Jalabert, 18 September 1872. Archives de l’Université Saint-Joseph, Beirut (AUSJ). It appears that not all students paid the same fees. For example, when Emir Selim’s wife sent her representative to demand her son Joseph’s admission to the school on 8
October 1873, she announced that she would pay twelve hundred qurush. The rector responded
that she would have to pay the full amount of eighteen hundred qurush. On 11 October of the same
year, however, Dawud Khurrat was admitted at a yearly rate of fourteen hundred qurush.

92/PO/A/150, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN). Conversions based
on Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge

Khater, Inventing Home.

Government bourses came later to Ghazir than to Antoura (1861 vs. 1853 or prior), prob-
ably due to the anti-clericalism of France’s Second Republic (1848-70). 67/ADP/16, Centre
des Archives Diplomatiques de La Courneuve (MAE).

67/ADP/16, MAE.

The two tiers of Catholic collèges are clear from students’ requests and from French grants.
Bourses at Antoura, la Sagesse, and the Greek Collège Patriarcat were worth four hundred
francs, and at USJ, six hundred. Bourses at Aramoun were 240 francs and at St. Jean Maron,
250, 92/PO/A/121, CADN; 92/PO/A/150, CADN; and 67/ADP/16, MAE.

“Demandes Bourses Accordées, 1880-1881,” 92/PO/A/122, CADN.

Ibid. The list included the son of a dragoman at the Italian consulate alongside names
from elite families: a Khazin, a Shihab, a Tabit, a Shahlu, a Ghanim, a Ghandur/Tarrad, a
Bellama, and two Dahdahs.

Ibid.

USJ Prospectus 1877, 2, Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus, Vanves (ACJV).

Ibid. For Antoura’s curriculum see 92/PO/A/145, CADN.

Ibid.

Grants to the teaching orders were also allocated as “bourses” for better-off children. Lazarist
S. Gélas wrote in 1861 that she planned to use ten thousand francs from the French govern-
ment that year to “take back the young ladies of the grand families that are now accepting
places at the (rival) school of the (Protestant) Prussian deaconesses.” S. Gélas to M. Étienne,
23 May 1861, in Annales de la congrégation de la mission de St. Vincent de Paul (1862), 500,
Antoura Collège Archive, Antoura, Lebanon; and 67/ADP/16, MAE.

In 1863, the Soeurs du Sacré Coeur had 2,425 students in the Bekaa, the Mariamettes had
1,180 in Mount Lebanon, and the Xavériens had 1,750. Bulletin des oeuvres des écoles
d’Orient (1863), 213. By 1901-2, there were a total of 13,195 students in Jesuit primary

Chantal Verdeil, La mission jésuite du Mont-Liban et de Syrie: 1830-1864 (Paris: Les Indes
Savants, 2011); and Claire Guillaume, “La congrégation des soeurs des Saints-Coeurs de
Jésus et de Marie au Mont-Liban dans la deuxième moitié du XIX siècle” (MA Thesis,
Paris-Sorbonne, 2015).

(2007), 213.

“Maitres Xavériens: Directives Pédagogiques,” 9/B/37, Xavériens, AUSJ, reproduced in
Khuri, Histoire du Liban, 332-333.


92/PO/A/122, CADN.

The Maqasid was largely an elite institution. See Jens Hansen, “From Social Status to Intellectu-
al Activity: Some Prosopographical Observations on the Municipal Council in Beirut, 1868-
1908,” in From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon, ed. Thomas Philipp and
Christoph Schumann (Wurzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2004), 70 and 150; Hansen, Fin de
Siècle, 63-64; ’Isam Shibaru, Jam’iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya fi Bayrut, 1290-1321 (Beirut: Dar Misbah al-Fikr, 2001); and Somel, Modernization of Public Education.

55 Hanssen, Fin de Siècle, 43; and Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 86-87.

56 Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 87-88; and Tibawi, American Interests, 257.


58 al-Fajr al-Sadiq, 16-7.


60 Yıldız Resmi Maruzat (Y.A.RES.), 21/27 no. 1 (22 August 1883), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA).

61 Somel, Modernization of Public Education; and Fortna, Imperial Classroom.

62 Maarif Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (MF.MKT.) 137/81 (21 March 1892), BOA.

63 “Al-Ma’arif,” Thamarat al-Funun 24 February-10 March 1890. This accords with the 1869 Educational Regulation, which “envisioned a complete, integrated network of schools that would […] funnel the top students to the capital for specialized training at the advanced level or directly into the scribal service of the central government.” Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 113.

64 Juhayna al-Ayyubi, “Jam’iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya fi Bayrut” (MA Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1966), 63. These costs were significant. In 1878, the two girls’ schools cost 142.8 lira and 65.86 lira; the boys’ school cost 7.2 lira. Contributions in the first four years ranged from twenty qurush from Ahmad al-Qabbani to 450 qurush from the Bayhums. Al-Fajr al-Sadiq, Year Four, reproduced in Shibaru, Jam’iyyat al-Maqasid, 408-25.

65 Shibaru, Jam’iyyat al-Maqasid, 35.

66 Hanssen, Fin de Siècle, 174; and Evered, Empire and Education, 66.

67 Dahiliye Mektubi Kalemi (DH.MKT.) 1592/3 (6 February 1889), BOA. The Ardati and Da’uq family owned businesses and buildings in Beirut. 92/PO/A/170, CADN.


69 Ibid.

70 Betty Anderson, The American University of Beirut (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 10; and Hanssen, Fin de Siècle, 175-76. The broader Ottoman educational system demonstrated limited social mobility. See Somel, Modernization of Public Education; Fortna, Imperial Classroom; and Eugene Rogan, “The Political Significance of an Ottoman Education,” in From the Syrian Land, op. cit.

71 Hanssen, Fin de Siècle, 174.

72 In 1893, the Beirut Education Ministry called on school administrators to collect fees from a certain ’Abd al-Qadir Efendi, one of “the wealthy denizens of the city” who had been sending his own sons to the idâdi on a scholarship meant for Beirut’s poor. The report noted scathingly that the Ministry’s investigations of this common practice would be “a heavy burden for the fathers who are wealthy and have good jobs, who [nonetheless] have successfully fed and clothed their children at the idâdi school rather than at home for years.” See MF.MKT. 184/152 (31 October 1893), BOA.

73 Hanssen, Fin de Siècle, 178.

74 They also allowed non-elite girls to access top-tier secondary institutions, the Beirut Female Seminary and the Tripoli School for Girls.

In 1880, yearly tuition was seventeen Ottoman lira for preparatory and collegiate students and twenty-two lira for medical and pharmacy. “SPC Catalogue 1880-81,” AUB Archives.

“Programme and Prospectus of the Native Protestant College Institute of Beirut, Syria,” (n.d., probably 1861-62), 14, 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28, Box 1: SPC Memorabilia, 1861-1901, AUB Archives.

Ibid.

“Programme and Prospectus of the Native Protestant College Institute of Beirut, Syria” (n.d., probably 1861-62), 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28, Box 1: SPC Memorabilia, 1861-1901, AUB Archives.


SPC Catalogue 1884-85, 7-8, quoted in Norbert Scholz, “Foreign Education and Indigenous Reaction in Late Ottoman Lebanon: Students and Teachers at the SPC in Beirut” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1997), 139.

According to Henry Jessup, these schools—and not their rural counterparts—were the “rills that fed the college river.” Tibawi, American Interests, 285.

Ibid., 240.

Ibid.


“Mr. March's Report on Common Schools,” 9 February 1888, RG 115: Box 13, PHS.


Scholz, “Foreign Education,” 312 and 326-28. This discrimination is one possible reason why Ya'qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr, two of the College's most distinguished graduates and founders of al-Muqtataf, left the college in 1882. See Elshakry, Reading Darwin, 72.

Day Book of Tripoli Station, 1882 (March and October), Near East School of Theology, Beirut.

Mission records cite two thousand students in 1875 and 3,308 in 1877, reflecting the difficulty of estimating student numbers from missionary sources. Tibawi, American Interests, 33, 212.

“Lebanon Station Report 1903,” RG 90: Box 2, 6, PHS.


Harriet La Grange, Letter on “Boarding Schools,” n.d., RG 115: Box 19, Folder 7, PHS.